


Speech errors reflect levels of representation...




... and inner speech could, in principle, operate on any of these levels

Three perspectives:

- 1. Abstract linguistic representations.** Awareness of inner speech, and therefore inner speech errors, occurs at the phonological level (e.g. Oppenheim & Dell, 2008; Wheelton & Levelt, 1995)
- 2. Embodied sensory-motor imagery.** Inner speech is like overt speech, minus the sound or motor movement (e.g. Dell, 1978; Postma & Noordanus, 1996).
- 3. Flexible abstraction.** Inner speech varies in the extent to which sensory-motor representations are used

Compared to overt speech (from Oppenheim & Dell, 2008)




Where is the crucial difference between inner and overt speech?

	Motor	Sound
Overt speech	X	X
Inner speech	-	-

New experiment

Mouthed speech	X	-
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Three predictions:




Inner speech will still be created and monitored as abstract phonemes

Already embodied imagery will not get more embodied

Mouthing will require more detailed inner speech

Methods



32 matched sets of stimuli


	Similar onsets				Dissimilar onsets			
Word outcome	lean	reed	reef	leech	bean	reed	reef	beech
Nonword outcome	lean	reed	wreath	leech	bean	reed	wreath	beech

80 participants


Results

Similar overall error distributions

2462 total self-reported errors
1265 mouthed
1197 unmouthed




Lexical bias in both mouthing conditions (no significant interactions)



Stronger phonemic similarity effect in mouthed inner speech




Correcting for potential monitoring bias (after Nootboom & Quené, 2008)



Minimal error-repair biases because competing errors show a distribution similar to target errors


The mouthing x similarity interaction remains



Discussion

The big picture

Combined data from the current study and Oppenheim & Dell (2008)



- Silent articulation, without auditory monitoring, is sufficient to create a phonemic similarity effect in speech errors
- Inner speech tends to be specified to at least the phoneme level, but not necessarily to the level of articulatory representations
 - This finding replicates Oppenheim & Dell (2008)
 - Argues against a strong embodiment account of inner speech, where cognition is necessarily based in sensory-motor processes
- Additional motor planning, or execution, can create a form of inner speech that incorporates articulatory information
 - Argues against a strong abstraction account of inner speech
- Speakers can flexibly adjust the abstractness of their imagery
 - This claim explains variable results in the field (e.g. Brocklehurst & Corley, 2009; Dell, 1978)

References

Brocklehurst, P. & Corley, M. (2009). Lexical bias and the phonemic similarity effect in inner speech. Paper presented at the 15th Annual Conference on Architectures and Mechanisms for Language Processing, 7-9 September 2009, Barcelona.
Dell, G. S. (1978). Slips of the mind. In M. Paradis (Ed.), *The fourth LACUS forum* (pp. 69-75). Columbia, S.C.: Hornbeam Press.
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